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INTRODUCTION 
As transnationalism becomes more prominent, comparative law is 
burgeoning.  In one area of American law, however, it has met a for-
midable challenge:  civil procedure.  Comparative civil procedure has 
been relatively slow to find its way into American law-school class-
rooms, legislation, and judicial opinions.1 
There are many reasons why, but one reason is American excep-
tionalism.  Though there is a vast difference between common law 
and civil law jurisdictions,2 American procedure is very different even 
from its common law kin.  As I and others have stated previously, 
American exceptionalism is a major obstacle to the benefits of com-
parative study and to potential reform in the field of civil procedure.3 
This may be changing, however.  Certain features of American 
procedure historically considered exceptionalist appear to be trend-
ing toward their foreign counterparts.4  These trends, should they 
continue, may make comparative study, and perhaps even harmoniza-
tion, easier.5  They also, however, pose new challenges to the cohe-
rence of our own American system. 
 
1 See Scott Dodson, Review Essay, The Challenge of Comparative Civil Procedure, 60 
ALA. L. REV. 133, 134 (2008) (reviewing OSCAR G. CHASE ET AL., CIVIL LITIGATION IN 
COMPARATIVE CONTEXT (Oscar G. Chase & Helen Hershkoff eds., 2007)) (noting that 
the United States has failed to borrow from and harmonize with procedures from for-
eign legal systems). 
2 For a discussion of the differences between common law and civil law traditions, 
see generally JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW 
TRADITION (3d ed. 2007). 
3 See Dodson, supra note 1, at 141-42 (pointing to a reverence for the civil jury trial 
and the “American Rule” for attorneys’ fees as examples); Oscar G. Chase, American 
“Exceptionalism” and Comparative Procedure, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 277, 278 (2002) (docu-
menting how “idiosyncrasies of American culture are reflected in the procedural rules 
that govern civil litigation”); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 
TEX. L. REV. 1665, 1665 (1998) (explaining that differences in discovery procedures 
between the United States and foreign jurisdictions present difficulties for harmoniz-
ing the law of procedure among jurisdictions); Richard L. Marcus, Putting American 
Procedural Exceptionalism into a Globalized Context, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 709, 709 (2005) 
(“Not only does America conceive itself, often ruefully, as the litigation superpower, 
but it also has a set of procedural characteristics that seem to set it off from almost all 
of the rest of the world.” (footnote omitted)). 
4 See Dodson, supra note 1, at 144-50 (citing liberal pleading rules, verdict con-
straints, and the involved role of the judiciary as areas in American law trending to-
wards harmonization). 
5 See id. at 143-44 (noting areas in American civil procedure where “[h]armoniz-
ation and alignment are particularly promising”). 
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Pleading is a particularly useful example.  It is a prominent fea-
ture of American civil procedure that has long been exceptional.  Un-
like civil law countries, which require detailed fact pleading and often 
evidentiary support at the outset, and unlike even most common law 
traditions that also require some fact pleading, Rule 8 requires only “a 
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is en-
titled to relief,”6 a formula that has traditionally focused on notice ra-
ther than facts.7  This conception of pleading is unlike any other in 
the world. 
But exceptionalism in American pleading may be waning, at least 
in discrete areas.  Congress has begun to experiment with imposing 
heightened pleading requirements in, for example, the Private Securi-
ties Litigation Reform Act of 1995.8  Similarly, but perhaps more dra-
matically, the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 9 and Ash-
croft v. Iqbal 10 recently imposed a transsubstantive “plausibility” 
standard that depends upon factual sufficiency, eliminating the more 
liberal notice-pleading standard that the Court had endorsed since 1957. 
It may be that these discrete changes do not reflect a deeper and 
broader change to American pleading.  Even if they did, the potential 
change to American pleading would still leave it significantly different 
from foreign models.  But the mere fact of these changes, even in 
their narrowest form, suggests that American procedure is neither 
static nor irrevocably exceptionalist.  If these trends do reflect a 
broader willingness to experiment with pleading and civil procedure 
generally, then they may allow for even more important gains, such as 
meaningful transnational dialogue between the U.S. and foreign sys-
tems, more valuable comparative analyses in the United States, and 
the potential to harmonize civil procedure across national boundaries.  
Of course, such trends also would present substantial challenges to 
the coherence, workability, and fairness of an American system built 
upon the premise of liberal pleading. 
Part I frames this discussion by analyzing the normative benefits 
of, and practical obstacles to, comparative civil procedure generally.  
Part II locates American pleading in its exceptionalist state by con-
trasting it with civil law and other common law systems.  Part III 
throws recent changes like Twombly and Iqbal into the mix and argues 
 
6 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). 
7 See infra Section II.A (discussing the history of the drafting of Rule 8). 
8 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
9 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
10 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
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that they are shifting—albeit gradually—the American approach clos-
er to the pleading standards of the rest of the world.  Part IV then dis-
cusses how this trend may affect the potential for comparative studies 
and transnational relations, both for pleading specifically and for civil 
procedure generally. 
I.  COMPARATIVE CIVIL PROCEDURE GENERALLY 
A.  Benefits 
Comparative civil procedure offers many of the same benefits as 
comparative study generally.  Comparative studies have academic, 
practical, reformative, and social benefits. 
Academically, studying the procedure and procedural traditions 
of other countries can deepen one’s understanding of U.S. procedur-
al norms and the underlying policy balances they strike.11  Practically, 
the increasing prevalence of transnational litigation and transactions 
concomitantly requires broader exposure to foreign laws and proce-
dures.  Advocates, advisers, and judges must have at least a working 
knowledge of foreign procedures to be able to frame, anticipate, or 
decide legal issues that cross national boundaries.12   
Reformatively, knowledge and understanding of other systems pro-
vide an opportunity for individual systems to devise, either via importa-
tion or exportation, a different model for solving common problems.  
On a multinational scale, such reforms can harmonize various indepen-
dent legal systems into a more coherent and accessible global system.13 
 
11 See CHASE ET AL., supra note 1, at 1-2 (describing the importance of a global ap-
proach to the study of civil procedure); THOMAS O. MAIN, GLOBAL ISSUES IN CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 2 (2006) (discussing how a comparative approach to learning procedural 
rules provides “meaningful context,” allowing students to more easily internalize the 
material); Kevin M. Clermont, Integrating Transnational Perspectives into Civil Procedure:  
What Not to Teach, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 524, 535 (2006) (highlighting how comparative 
procedural study helps to overcome misconceptions and deepen understanding of 
one’s own legal system); John H. Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure in the 
United States, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 545, 545 (1995) (“The purpose of comparative study is 
to help understand what is distinctive (and problematic) about domestic law.”). 
12 See CHASE ET AL., supra note 1, at 2 (explaining the pragmatic advantages of 
comparative legal study, including international legal practice); MAIN, supra note 11, at 
1 (“In this era of increasing globalization, provincialism can be not only an embar-
rassment, but a professional liability.”); Clermont, supra note 11, at 525 (emphasizing 
that a familiarity with foreign systems is a necessity in our increasingly global society). 
13 See Dodson, supra note 1, at 139 (defining harmonization as “a coming together 
of various independent legal systems”).  There are downsides to harmonization, of 
course.  See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Parker, Comparative Civil Procedure and Transnational “Harmo-
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Socially, a comparative civil procedure study may help bring na-
tions and cultures closer together in a global community by broaden-
ing perspectives, reducing isolationism, and increasing tolerance,14 
perhaps thereby improving international relations.15 
B.  Obstacles 
Despite these potential benefits, several significant obstacles have 
stymied comparative civil procedure in the United States.  First, civil 
procedure is extensively rooted in its home legal system.16  Various 
procedures are built upon each other—notice pleading, for example, 
is tied to liberal discovery17—and, as a result, alteration of one rule 
may disrupt others.18  Civil procedure also derives from and reflects 
deep-seated, often peculiarly held, values of the society it regulates.19  
This interconnectivity makes comparative procedure particularly resis-
tant to the benefits normally attendant to comparative studies.20 
 
nization”:  A Law-and-Economics Perspective 3-4 (George Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Re-
search Paper Series, Paper No. 09-03, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_ 
id=1325013 (arguing that legal diversity among nations, like diversity in product mar-
kets, can be welfare enhancing). 
14 See MAIN, supra note 11, at 2 (proposing that procedure be studied from inter-
national, transnational, and comparative perspectives); Clermont, supra note 11, at 535 
(noting a common misconception that the procedure in one’s home jurisdiction pro-
vides the only set of rules that works). 
15 See Dodson, supra note 1, at 139-40 (proposing that “a willingness to appreciate 
other solutions can represent a step towards better international relations”). 
16 See id. at 140 (acknowledging that because procedure is tied to the fundamental 
principles of one’s home system, it is resistant to change). 
17 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 68, at 
470 (6th ed. 2002) (“The keystone of the system of procedure embodied in the rules is 
Rule 8 . . . . The other procedural devices of the rules—broad joinder, discovery, free 
amendment, and summary judgment—rest on these provisions about pleadings.”). 
18 See Marcus, supra note 3, at 710 (discussing the interdependence of proce-
dural elements). 
19 See Chase, supra note 3, at 278 (“[T]he formal procedures of dispute resolution 
found in any culture reflect and express its metaphysics and its values . . . .”); see also 
Kevin M. Clermont, Why Comparative Civil Procedure?, Foreword to KUO-CHANG HUANG, 
INTRODUCING DISCOVERY INTO CIVIL LAW, at ix, xii (2003) (arguing that procedure is 
“surprisingly culture-bound”); Hein Kötz, Civil Justice Systems in Europe and the United 
States, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 61, 71 (2003) (presenting the view that rules are 
rooted in a “country’s peculiar features of history, social structure, and political con-
sensus”).  In addition, the values underlying civil procedure choices are more subtle 
and latent than substantive norms.  I am indebted to Kevin Clermont for this point. 
20 See Clermont, supra note 19, at ix, xi (noting that comparative scholarship is de-
licate and that actual transplanting is uncommon); Marcus, supra note 3, at 710 (ar-
guing that the hesitance of American proceduralists to consider comparative insights is 
a result of the parochial view that comparative insights are “of relatively little utility and 
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Second, American proceduralists are infamously provincial21 
(though my own assessment is that this is changing22).  Many students 
in U.S. law schools will never learn a thing about the civil procedure 
rules or systems of other countries.23  Judges and legislators interpret-
ing procedural rules or implementing procedural reforms are far 
more likely to look inward than outward.24  Unilingualism and geo-
graphical isolation perpetuate U.S. self-centeredness. 
Finally, and of particular relevance here, American procedure’s 
entrenched exceptionalism creates barriers to comparativism.25  The 
list of exceptionalist features is extensive:  liberal pleading, liberal 
(and costly) discovery, class actions, a disengaged judge, civil juries, 
largely unfettered damage assessments, and the “American rule” of 
cost allocation.26  It is much harder to understand, appreciate, and 
 
perhaps even dangerous”); cf. John C. Reitz, Why We Probably Cannot Adopt the German 
Advantage in Civil Procedure, 75 IOWA L. REV. 987, 988 (1990) (arguing that adopting 
certain German civil procedure features could not be done “without radically changing 
other important aspects of our legal culture”). 
21 See Antonio Gidi, Teaching Comparative Civil Procedure, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 502, 
502 (2006) (“American proceduralists are among the most parochial in the world.”). 
22 Cf. Paul R. Dubinsky, Is Transnational Litigation a Distinct Field?  The Persistence of 
Exceptionalism in American Procedural Law, 44 STAN. J. INT’L L. 301, 355 (2008) (“[T]he 
current crop of American scholars in civil procedure and conflict of laws is perhaps as 
well versed in the comparative and international dimensions of their field as any group 
of American legal scholars and any generation of American proceduralists.”); Parker, 
supra note 13, at 1-2 (“[R]ecent trends show increasing attention to comparative pro-
cedural law, and in particular to civil procedure.”). 
23 See Gidi, supra note 21, at 502 (stating that comparative civil procedure’s “perva-
sive absence” from American law schools is “well documented”); Langbein, supra note 
11, at 545 (“The study of comparative procedure in the United States has little follow-
ing in academia, and virtually no audience in the courts or in legal policy circles.”); 
Marcus, supra note 3, at 740 (lamenting that, in the United States, “comparative pro-
cedure is barely on the map”).  That is not to say that U.S. civil procedure courses do 
not have a transnational flair at times.  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006) (creating alie-
nage jurisdiction); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f), 4(h) (governing international service of process); 
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (discussing personal juris-
diction over a foreign defendant); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (de-
scribing forum non conveniens).  But these are simply international flavorings to Ameri-
can procedural law.  They are not comparisons of foreign rules and systems. 
24 See Dubinsky, supra note 22, at 308 (highlighting a “tendency of the American 
bench to approach transnational scenarios from the perspective of interstate frame-
works, precedents, and policy concerns”). 
25 See Chase, supra note 3, at 287-301 (examining features of American exceptio-
nalism); Dodson, supra note 1, at 141 (noting that American exceptionalism is “deeply 
entrenched”). 
26 I have discussed these exceptionalist features previously in Dodson, supra note 
1, at 141-42. 
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model a contrary perspective when one’s home perspective is both so 
rooted and so different. 
These barriers all but foreclose large-scale, rapid changes in U.S. 
procedure absent, perhaps, some urgent crisis.27  The question posed 
here is whether components of American exceptionalism, such as 
pleading, are impervious to gradual changes and, if not, what that 
might mean for the future of comparative civil procedure. 
II.  AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM IN FEDERAL CIVIL PLEADING 
America has the most lax pleading system in the world.28  That has 
not always been the case.  America inherited its common law proce-
dural rules from Great Britain, and its pleading system evolved in ana-
logous ways until the twentieth century.  Since the adoption of the Fed-
eral Rules, however, American pleading has taken a very different path. 
A.  Traditional Rule 8 Pleading in the United States 
The Federal Rules were a result of dissatisfaction with the Field 
Code, which dominated court practice from 1848 to 1938.29  Code 
pleading required the complaint to contain “[a] statement of the facts 
constituting the cause of action.”30  Correlatively, the Codes severely 
limited discovery.31 
Later dissatisfaction with the Codes in general (and their re-
quirement that plaintiffs plead "ultimate" facts, as opposed to evi-
dence or "evidentiary" facts32) then led to the consideration and adop-
 
27 See Richard L. Marcus, Modes of Procedural Reform, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 157, 186-87 (2008) (arguing that major American procedural reform generally 
happens only in response to a crisis). 
28 See CHASE ET AL., supra note 1, at 8 (comparing the American system of notice 
pleading to the heightened requirements of fact pleading used in most civil  
law countries). 
29 See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 
909, 933-74 (1987) (documenting the history and motivation of the adoption of the 
Federal Rules). 
30 Act of Apr. 12, 1848, ch. 379, § 120(2), 1848 N.Y. Laws 521; see also 5 CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1216 (3d 
ed. 2004) (comparing Rule 8 with the fact pleading required by the old code precedents). 
31 The Codes disallowed interrogatories and strictly limited document requests 
and oral depositions.  See Subrin, supra note 29, at 936-37 (listing additional limitations 
of discovery in code pleading). 
32 See Charles E. Clark, History, Systems and Functions of Pleading, 11 VA. L. REV. 517, 
533 (1925) (calling the system of pleading facts one of the “most important” characte-
ristics of the Codes). 
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tion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Charles E. Clark, the 
principal drafter of the Rules33 and a passionate advocate of relaxed 
pleading,34 designed Rule 8 to eliminate the problems of fact pleading 
under the Codes.35  The drafters “wanted something simple, uniform, 
and transsubstantive.”36 
Changes to pleading corresponded with broader changes 
throughout the procedural system.  The Federal Rules were designed 
to install, in Professor Marcus’s words, a “‘liberal ethos,’ in which the 
preferred disposition is on the merits, by jury trial, after full disclosure 
through discovery.”37  The drafters wanted to reduce the importance 
of pleadings,38 particularly as a vehicle for merits determinations, and 
instead placed the burden of weeding out meritless lawsuits on liberal 
discovery and summary judgment.39  Thus, the primary goal of Rule 8 
moved from isolation of issues, factual development, and merits de-
termination to notice.40 
 
33 See Fred Rodell, For Charles E. Clark:  A Brief and Belated but Fond Farewell, 65 CO-
LUM. L. REV. 1323, 1323 (1965) (calling Clark the “prime instigator and architect of 
the rules of federal civil procedure”). 
34 Clark initially favored abolishing pleading motions altogether so that all merits 
dispositions would occur via trial or summary judgment.  See Michael E. Smith, Judge 
Charles E. Clark and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 YALE L.J. 914, 927-28 (1976) (de-
scribing Clark’s preference for Rule 56 summary judgment over the devices of Rule 12). 
35 See Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 
1749, 1749 (1998) [hereinafter Marcus, Puzzling] (asserting that the drafters of Rule 8 
wished to “curtail reliance on the pleadings”); Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact 
Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 433 (1986) 
[hereinafter Marcus, Revival] (stating that Rule 8 “was designed to escape the com-
plexities of fact pleading”). 
36 Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 556 (2002). 
37 Marcus, Revival, supra note 35, at 439; see also Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of 
Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 318-19 (1938) (denouncing dismissals based on  
the pleadings). 
38 See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 17, at 458 (“The draftsmen of the Civil Rules 
proceeded on the conviction, based on experience at common law and under the 
codes, that pleadings are not of great importance in a lawsuit.”). 
39 See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 
507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993) (“[F]ederal courts and litigants must rely on summary 
judgment and control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims . . . .”); Charles E. 
Clark, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:  The Last Phase—Underlying Philosophy Em-
bodied in Some of the Basic Provisions of the New Procedure, 23 A.B.A. J. 976, 977 (1937) 
(“[T]hrough the weapons of discovery and summary judgment we have developed new 
devices, with more appropriate penalties to aid in matters of proof, and do not need to 
force the pleadings to their less appropriate function.”); Marcus, Revival, supra note 35, 
at 440 (describing features of the Federal Rules, such as expanded discovery, which 
provided courts a heightened ability to decide the merits of a case on summary judgment). 
40 See Fairman, supra note 36, at 556 (“Instead of requiring pleadings to serve the 
multiple functions of notice, fact development, winnowing, and early disposition, un-
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The resulting Rule 8 requires only “a short and plain statement of 
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”41  Rule 8 thus 
moved away from fact pleading42 and instituted something much clos-
er to notice pleading.43  As Judge Posner has put it, “The federal rules 
replaced fact pleading with notice pleading.”44 
Rule 8 conspicuously lacks any mention of facts.45  Of course, it 
would be difficult to provide proper notice without recitation of at 
least some facts.46  But, as Clark later wrote, 
The notice in mind is rather that of the general nature of the case and 
the circumstances or events upon which it is based, so as to differentiate 
it from other acts or events, to inform the opponent of the affair or 
transaction to be litigated—but not of details which he should ascertain 
for himself in preparing his defense—and to tell the court of the broad 
outlines of the case.
47
 
Of course, what is needed to provide notice may vary depending 
upon the claim and the circumstances.48  But the point of Rule 8 is 
that notice—not factual detail—is the ultimate touchstone.49 
 
der the Federal Rules pleadings serve but a single function:  providing notice.”). 
41 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
42 See Edward D. Cavanagh, Twombly, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
Courts, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 877, 877 (2008) (explaining how the drafters declined to 
require a plaintiff to allege facts sufficient to establish a cause of action); Christopher 
M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 1007 (2003) (stating that 
Rule 8 was specifically designed to inter the old code pleading requirement of plead-
ing facts constituting a cause of action). 
43 See Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 460-61 (1943) (remarking 
that notice was the principal goal of pleading when the rules were developed); Fair-
man, supra note 42, at 990 (“A procedural system with notice pleading at its core is no 
accident.”).  But see Marcus, Puzzling, supra note 35, at 1749-51 (arguing that pleadings 
should be dismissed only when the allegations themselves demonstrate a bar to relief).   
44 Thomson v. Washington, 362 F.3d 969, 970 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Fairman, su-
pra note 42, at 988 (“If any rule in federal civil procedure deserves the label ‘blacklet-
ter,’ it is notice pleading.”). 
45 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 30, § 1216 (“Conspicuously absent from Fed-
eral Rule 8(a)(2) is the requirement found in the codes that the pleader set forth the 
‘facts’ constituting a ‘cause of action.’”). 
46 See ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1955 REPORT OF THE AD-
VISORY COMMITTEE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR 
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS (stating that Rule 8’s contemplation of facts is 
only to distinguish the claim from a bare averment that the plaintiff wants and is entitled 
to relief), reprinted in WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 30, app. F, at 644-45. 
47 Clark, supra note 43, at 460-61. 
48 See Fairman, supra note 42, at 1001 (“To provide notice, some complaints cer-
tainly go beyond . . . skeletal illustrations . . . . What simplified notice pleading calls for 
is a general description of the case.  To do so, more or less description may be inhe-
rent.” (footnote omitted)). 
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Most heralded the 1938 Federal Rules as a great success, and more 
than half of the states adopted rules modeled after them.50  Neverthe-
less, federal courts interpreting pleading standards in their immediate 
aftermath tended to ignore them.51  Lower courts, still enamored with 
fact pleading, interpreted Rule 8 to require “a detailed narrative . . . 
setting forth all elements of a claim,”52 something indistinguishable 
from pre-Rules pleading. 
In 1957, the Supreme Court purported to put that resistance to 
Rule 8 to rest in Conley v. Gibson.53  According to the Court, “the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in 
detail the facts upon which he bases his claim.”54  Instead, Rule 8 re-
quired only “simplified ‘notice pleading,’”55 which meant providing 
“fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it 
rests.”56  That language suggests that Conley meant to put the question-
ing of liberal notice pleading to rest.57 
Conley also admonished, however, that “a complaint should not be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt 
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim 
which would entitle him to relief.”58  This language literally precluded 
dismissal if the plaintiff asserted a valid legal theory, and it allowed 
dismissal only if discovery would be futile.59 
 
49 But see Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2):  Toward a Structured Approach to Federal Pleading Prac-
tice, 243 F.R.D. 604, 605 (2007) (“Assertions that the rule does not require the pleading 
of facts . . . are both oft stated and . . . demonstrably false.”).  
50 See Subrin, supra note 29, at 910 (“Approximately half of the states adopted al-
most identical rules [to the Federal Rules], and procedural rules in the remainder of 
the states bear their influence.”). 
51 See Marcus, Revival, supra note 35, at 433 (“There were pockets of resistance 
against the new pleading rules in the years after 1938 . . . .”); Subrin, supra note 29, at 
983 (“Soon after the Federal Rules went into effect there were signs that both lawyers 
and judges felt a need to limit the system that the drafters had created.”). 
52 Hazard, supra note 3, at 1685; see also Marcus, Puzzling, supra note 35, at 1750 
(noting the resistance to Rule 8’s liberal pleading standard). 
53 See Marcus, Revival, supra note 35, at 445 (“Conley v. Gibson seemed to scotch the 
effort to revert to code practice.”). 
54 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 See Marcus, Revival, supra note 35, at 434 (opining that the thrust of Conley 
seems to be that pleadings need only give general notice but nothing more); A. Ben-
jamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 20 (2009) (“Conley 
v. Gibson sealed the deal [on the issue of notice pleading].”). 
58 Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46. 
59 See Marcus, Revival, supra note 35, at 434 (“Taken literally, [Conley] might have 
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Despite Conley’s endorsement of notice pleading, defendants con-
tinued to move to dismiss pleadings, and courts continued to grant 
their motions.60  Lower courts reimposed restrictive pleading in a 
number of substantive areas.61  A litigation boom in the 1960s and 
1970s spurred courts to dismiss complaints regularly for factual defi-
ciencies.62  Pleading became a mechanism to “test[] doubtful claims.”63  
Even antitrust cases fell victim to heightened pleading standards,64 de-
spite the Supreme Court’s admonition that antitrust cases should be 
dismissed sparingly.65 
Despite these lower court attempts to impose heightened pleading 
standards after Conley, the Supreme Court consistently rebuffed 
 
precluded dismissal in any case where the plaintiff invoked a valid legal theory.”).  Pro-
fessor Hazard has argued that Conley’s interpretation is contrary to Rule 8.  See Hazard, 
supra note 3, at 1685 (arguing that Conley “turned Rule 8 on its head by holding that a 
claim is insufficient only if the insufficiency appears from the pleading itself.”).  Others 
disagree.  See, e.g., Emily Sherwin, The Story of Conley:  Precedent by Accident, in CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE STORIES 295, 315-16 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008) (arguing that the 
“no set of facts” language in Conley should be interpreted literally). 
60 See Edward Brunet & David J. Sweeney, Integrating Antitrust Procedure and Sub-
stance After Northwest Wholesale Stationers:  Evolving Antitrust Approaches to Pleadings, 
Burden of Proof, and Boycotts, 72 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1071 (1986) (“Nonetheless, a close 
look at Burger Court antitrust decisions reveals thinking at odds with the notice plead-
ing tradition.”); Marcus, Puzzling, supra note 35, at 1750 (documenting that, after Con-
ley, “pleading practice persisted.  In some areas . . . the courts appeared to disinter fact 
pleading.”); Marcus, Revival, supra note 35, at 434 (remarking that applying Conley in 
subsequent cases was “problematic”); Ettie Ward, The After-Shocks of Twombly: Will We 
“Notice” Pleading Changes?, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 893, 899 (2008) (“District courts rou-
tinely grant motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim . . . .”). 
61 See Fairman, supra note 36, at 551 (“Despite [the] clarity [of Rule 8] and the 
Supreme Court’s endorsement of notice pleading in Conley v. Gibson, federal courts 
have embraced heightened pleading burdens in a variety of situations.” (footnote 
omitted)); Fairman, supra note 42, at 1011-59 (discussing judicially imposed heigh-
tened pleading in antitrust, civil rights, RICO, conspiracy, and defamation claims). 
62 Marcus, Revival, supra note 35, at 435-36 (recounting the revival of fact pleading). 
63 Marcus, Puzzling, supra note 35, at 1776; see also Fairman, supra note 36, at 567 
(arguing that, despite Rule 8 and Conley, lower federal courts imposed heightened 
pleading in civil rights cases out of concern for increasing caseloads and a perception 
of rampant frivolousness). 
64 See Harvey Kurzweil et al., Twombly:  Another Swing of the Pleading Pendulum, 9 
SEDONA CONF. J. 115, 118-19 (2008) (recounting the shift in circuit courts away from 
bare-bones notice pleading in antitrust cases). 
65 See Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976) (“[D]ismissals 
prior to giving the plaintiff ample opportunity for discovery should be granted very 
sparingly.”); Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) 
(“[S]ummary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation 
where motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the al-
leged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot.”). 
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them.66  Until very recently, the Court never wavered in reaffirming 
Conley’s liberal notice pleading standard and its “no set of facts” lan-
guage, even in antitrust cases.67  Thus, at least until recently, notice 
pleading, not fact pleading, has been the traditional touchstone of 
American pleading under Rule 8.68 
B.  Foreign Approaches 
This American federal pleading standard is quite exceptionalist; 
no other country’s pleading requirements are so relaxed.  Civil law 
countries, as typified by Germany and France,69 require substantially 
more than the American system’s focus on notice pleading.  In Ger-
many, the initial complaint occupies a place of central importance.70  
Consequently, the German system requires “specific fact pleading and 
does not permit mere notice pleading.”71  German procedure also re-
 
66 See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 509-10 (2002) (rejecting the 
Second Circuit’s heightened pleading standard); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Nar-
cotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (rejecting the Fifth 
Circuit’s heightened pleading standard); see also Fairman, supra note 42, at 997 
(“[W]hen called upon to address pleading issues square on, the Court continually—
and unanimously—embraces simplified notice pleading.”). 
67 See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 811 (1993) (affirming the 
denial of a motion to dismiss). 
68 See Paul V. Niemeyer, Here We Go Again:  Are the Federal Discovery Rules Really in 
Need of Amendment?, 39 B.C. L. REV. 517, 520 (1998) (describing notice pleading 
coupled with broad discovery and broad discretion as “embedded in the infrastructure 
of American civil procedure”); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. 
REV. 431, 434 (2008) (“Since . . . 1938, notice pleading has been the watchword for the 
system of pleading in federal civil courts.”). 
69 Germany and France are particularly appropriate for comparison because 
“[e]ach . . . has made a major contribution to the civil law tradition, and each still oc-
cupies a position of intellectual leadership in the civil law world.”  MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-
PERDOMO, supra note 2, at ix; see also Marcus, supra note 3, at 717-18 (noting the histor-
ical prevalence of the German civil procedure system as a model for comparisons with 
the American system); Stephen N. Subrin, Discovery in Global Perspective: Are We Nuts?, 
52 DEPAUL L. REV. 299, 301 (2002) (noting that, in comparing American civil proce-
dure to other countries, it is typical to look at England, France, Germany, Italy, and 
Japan).  Of course, civil law systems are dynamic and differ widely.  See MERRYMAN & 
PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 2, at 143-47 (describing the diversity of legal systems of 
different countries, and attributing it in part to cultural and historical circumstances).  
Thus, I must rely on some generalities and extrapolations in this Section. 
70 ANDREW J. MCCLURG ET AL., PRACTICAL GLOBAL TORT LITIGATION:  UNITED 
STATES, GERMANY AND ARGENTINA 65 (2007) (calling the initial complaint “the crucial 
blueprint on which the entire lawsuit will depend”). 
71 PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF STÜRNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE 198 (2004); see also 
CHASE ET AL., supra note 1, at 171 (noting that the statement of a claim should also 
“provide details of factual circumstances supporting the petition as well as the designa-
tion of the evidence by which the party will prove its factual allegations.” (citation 
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quires a party to designate the means of proof (for example, by identi-
fying documents and witnesses) for each factual assertion in the 
pleadings.72  Other civil law countries have slightly different pleading 
standards but uniformly require some level of fact pleading beyond 
the American system’s notice regime.73 
Asian procedural systems, such as Japan’s,74 also require fact plead-
ing (and submission of evidence at the pleading stage).75  Japan’s 1996 
 
omitted)); John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 823, 827 (1985) (stating that the complaint should contain the “key facts” and 
“propose[] means of proof for its main factual contentions”).  German law professor 
Peter Schlosser has described the factual requirements of the complaint: 
In Germany, litigation starts with the submission of a written statement to the 
court . . . [that] is a very extensive, detailed and, if it comes from a qualified 
attorney, very carefully drafted paper. . . . If documentary evidence is available, 
it will usually be enclosed.  Should circumstantial evidence exist, it is also ex-
plained to the judge in the statement of claim and may be emphasized by cop-
ies of relevant documents and other materials. 
Peter F. Schlosser, Lectures on Civil-Law Litigation Systems and American Cooperation with 
Those Systems, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 9, 12 (1996) (footnote omitted). 
72 MURRAY & STÜRNER, supra note 71, at 197-98; see also Langbein, supra note 71, at 
827 (stating that the complaint should contain a proposed means of proof for the key 
facts as well as a list of both the supporting documents in the plaintiff’s possession and 
the other documents and witnesses that will support his position); James R. Maxeiner, 
Legal Certainty:  A European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy?, 15 TUL. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 541, 575 (2007) (asserting that the plaintiff must include all facts upon which 
the claim is based, as well as proof for the stated facts). 
73 See MAIN, supra note 11, at 28-29 (stating that a complaint in Spain must provide 
a complete narrative of the factual background and reference all documents that are 
to be attached to the complaint); id. at 29 (stating that, in Austria, the plaintiff must 
include a statement of the facts upon which the claim is based in the complaint); 
Schlosser, supra note 71, at 13 (stating that while French pleading is more notice based 
than German pleading, the plaintiff must still provide a statement of the facts to justify 
the claim); Michele Taruffo, Civil Procedure and the Path of a Civil Case (reporting similar 
standards in Italy), in INTRODUCTION TO ITALIAN LAW 159, 166 ( Jeffrey S. Lena & Ugo 
Mattei eds., 2002). 
74 Japan is a common comparison country because it adopted the Germanic civil law 
system virtually verbatim but has been heavily influenced by U.S. procedure and public 
law in ways that make it a relatively unique hybrid system.  See CHASE ET AL., supra note 1, 
at 4 (noting that Japan’s system combines elements of civil law and common law proce-
dure); MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 2, at 4 (discussing the influence of both 
civil and common law notions on the development of Japanese legal traditions). 
75 Japanese law 
requires that “the operative fact-basis of the claim” be specified as well as rele-
vant important indirect facts that relate to the cause of action [in the com-
plaint].  Evidence should be itemized and written out according to each point 
to be proved. . . . The role of the complaint is to disclose all of the important 
facts and evidence at an early stage as well as to identify the nature of the claim. 
Takeshi Kojima, Japanese Civil Procedure in Comparative Law Perspective, 46 U. KAN. L. 
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Revised Code requires the complaint to “specif[y] and particular-
ize[e]” the claim, include the facts on which it is based, delineate “re-
levant indirect facts” related to the claim, and itemize the evidence 
corresponding to each point the plaintiff will prove.76  If the plaintiff 
does not include the required facts, the complaint may be dismissed 
before it is ever served on the defendant.77  Other Asian pleading sys-
tems have similar fact-pleading requirements.78 
Prevailing common law systems have more in common with these 
civil law pleading requirements than with the American system.  In 
England79 the pleadings must contain a “statement . . . of the material 
facts on which the party pleading relies”;80 a statement of “the neces-
sary particulars,” designed to give notice;81 and a summary of the evi-
dence the claimant has against the defendant.82  If the claimant files a 
formal petition, he must provide additional details, possibly including 
relevant documents.83  This “statement of the case” allows the parties 
to define the nature of the dispute and to facilitate orderly process, 
 
REV. 687, 697 (1998) (footnote omitted) (quoting MINSOHŌ KISOKU [Rules of Civil 
Procedure], Sup. Ct. Rule No. 5 of 1996). 
76 Id.; see also CARL F. GOODMAN, JUSTICE AND CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN 257 
(2004) (“It is not sufficient to allege ultimate facts but also underlying facts that need 
to be established to support the claim must be asserted.”). 
77 Id. 
78 In China, the bill of complaint must set forth the facts and reasons on which the 
request is based, as well as evidence and the source of the evidence.  See Lindsey Kiang, 
Intellectual Property Litigation in the People’s Republic of China, in CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW OF 
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 113 (1993), WL 369 PLI/Pat 113.  In India, plead-
ings must state the material facts, defined as “[a]ll the primary facts which must be 
proved at the trial by a party to establish the existence of a cause of action or his de-
fence.”  See C.K. TAKWANI, CIVIL PROCEDURE 109 (3d ed. 1994) (quoting Udhav Singh 
v. Madhav Rao Scindia (1976) 2 S.C.R. 246, 257 (India)). 
79 England is a common comparison country because it is the parent to the U.S. 
legal system.  See Subrin, supra note 29, at 914-18 (noting the influence of England’s 
common law system on the development of U.S. procedure).  Common law systems 
include the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Israel, 
Singapore, and Bermuda.  See Hazard, supra note 3, at 1672 (noting that all of these 
systems derive from the English system). 
80 RSC O.18 r. 7(1) (U.K.). 
81 Id. O.18 r. 12(1) (U.K.). 
82 See NEIL ANDREWS, ENGLISH CIVIL PROCEDURE 254 (2003) (specifying that 
“[t]he claimant is not required to adduce at this early stage details of the evidence by 
which he intends to establish his claim” but must describe the facts and details relating 
to his allegations). 
83 See id. at 251-56 (recognizing that, while the rules permit the inclusion of any 
document necessary to support the claim, courts urge the filing of excerpts due to li-
mited filing space); CHASE ET AL., supra note 1, at 166 (describing the other required 
elements of a claim form, most notably the duty to disclose funding arrangements such 
as the existence of a conditional fee agreement). 
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provides notice of relevant issues in order to prevent surprise and sa-
tisfy due notice requirements, prevents an inadvertent false admission, 
sets the scope of the litigation for purposes of efficiency and res judicata, 
and allows either party to get rid of the case as a matter of law if war-
ranted.84  Other common law systems have similar requirements.85 
Finally, attempts to create an international pleading norm have 
disfavored the American system in favor of fact pleading.  The 
ALI/UNIDROIT principles reject notice pleading, instead requiring a 
statement of facts that “must, so far as reasonably practicable, set forth 
detail as to time, place, participants, and events.”86 
In sum, pleading standards are substantially identical in most legal 
systems, requiring that the facts supporting a claim be stated with rea-
sonable particularity.  This nearly universal standard is, as Professor 
Hazard has noted, essentially similar to the old code pleading re-
quirement rejected by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.87  As a re-
sult, no other country has (nor apparently, wants) the kind of libera-
lized pleading, focused on notice rather than facts, that America has 
chosen to reaffirm repeatedly and emphatically—at least until recently. 
III.  CURRENT TRENDS IN AMERICAN FEDERAL CIVIL PLEADING 
Recent trends in American pleading suggest that America may be 
moving toward the global norm by experimenting with more rigorous 
fact pleading and dispensing with mere notice pleading.  Those trends 
manifest themselves both through congressional statutes that provide 
for heightened pleading and through court interpretations of the 
pleading rules. 
A.  Statutes 
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)88 
imposes heightened pleading requirements for certain securities 
claims.  It requires pleading with particularity for claims based on mis-
leading statements or omissions.89  It also imposes heightened plead-
 
84 ANDREWS, supra note 82, at 253. 
85 See MAIN, supra note 11, at 28-32 (noting that other countries similarly require 
factual specificity, pleading evidence, and legal precision). 
86 ALI/UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE princ. 12.3 
(2006). 
87 Hazard, supra note 3, at 1671. 
88 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
89 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2006) (“[T]he complaint shall specify each statement 
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ing requirements for claims containing an element of scienter.90  As 
should be obvious, the PSLRA breaks with the notice pleading of 
Rule 8 and replaces it with fact pleading more akin to the global 
norm.  As Professor Richard Marcus has put it, “[T]he PSLRA sought 
to substitute for the Federal Rules’ attitude toward initiating a lawsuit 
a view more symptomatic of the rest of the world.”91 
Similarly, though perhaps less striking because of its comparatively 
narrow scope, the Y2K Act,92 designed to control lawsuits based on 
computer failures on January 1, 2000, also imposed pleading re-
quirements more onerous than the traditional notice regime.  Indeed, 
the Y2K Act requirements seem borrowed from a typical civil law ju-
risdiction.  They include requirements that a claim set out “a state-
ment of the facts giving rise to a strong inference” of scienter,93 that 
the complaint be accompanied by “a statement of specific informa-
tion” regarding “the nature and amount of each element of damages 
and the factual basis for the damages calculation,”94 and that the com-
plainant disclose “the manifestations of the material defects and the 
facts supporting a conclusion that the defects are material.”95 
The PSLRA and the Y2K Act demonstrate a newfound congres-
sional willingness to experiment with rigorous pleading standards 
normally found only outside Rule 8.  True, those experiments have 
been narrowly applied to specific subject-matter areas.  Nevertheless, 
the rationales for heightened fact pleading in those areas apply well 
beyond them,96 and there is evidence that Congress is interested in 
broadening the experiment.97 
 
alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, 
and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on information and 
belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.”). 
90 Id. § 78u-4(b)(2) (“[T]he complaint shall . . . state with particularity facts giving 
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”). 
91 Marcus, supra note 27, at 178. 
92 Pub. L. No. 106-37, 113 Stat. 185 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6601–6617). 
93 15 U.S.C. § 6607(d). 
94 Id. § 6607(b). 
95 Id. § 6607(c). 
96 Both the PSLRA and the Y2K Act were designed to curb frivolous claims. See S. 
REP. NO. 104-98, at 4 (1995) (describing the PSLRA’s goal of deterring frivolous strike 
suits), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683; Fairman, supra note 36, at 613-15 
(noting that President Clinton’s Y2K signing statement reiterated legislative concerns 
for deterring frivolous claims); Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays:  
An Analysis of the Effect of the PSLRA’s Internal-Information Standard on ’33 and ’34 Act 
Claims, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 537, 552-57 (1998) (describing Congress’s motivation for 
reform as stemming from concern about the negative impact frivolous suits were hav-
ing on market credibility and regulation).  This justification has wide appeal.  See, e.g., 
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B.  Twombly and Iqbal 
Perhaps more dramatically, the Supreme Court has begun to cur-
tail notice pleading in a way that it never before endorsed.  That trend 
began just two years ago in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,98 a case that 
imposed a fact-pleading standard of “plausibility,”99 eviscerated the 
liberal general notice-pleading standard set forth in Conley,100 and, in 
contrast to previous pleading decisions, affirmed (rather than re-
jected) lower court attempts to impose something more than mere 
notice pleading.101 
Twombly was a consumer class-action lawsuit against telecommuni-
cations providers for antitrust conspiracy claims under section 1 of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act.102  The plaintiffs alleged an “agreement” and a 
“conspiracy,” relying on allegations of conscious parallel conduct.103  
The problem was that conscious parallel conduct itself is not unlawful; 
an actual agreement is necessary to find a section 1 violation.104  That 
would not have posed great difficulties for the plaintiffs if conscious 
parallel conduct could raise a permissible inference of such an 
 
Fairman, supra note 36, at 567 (noting that lower federal courts have imposed heigh-
tened pleading in civil rights cases based upon a perception of rampant frivolousness). 
97 For example, Congress considered heightened pleading for nationwide class 
actions in early versions of the Class Action Fairness Act.  See Class Action Fairness Act 
of 2001, H.R. 2341, 107th Cong. § 1716(a)–(b) (2001) (requiring plaintiffs to specify 
relief, scienter, and alleged injury with “particularity” in their pleadings). 
98 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
99 See Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. 
L. REV. IN BRIEF 135, 138 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief.php?s= 
inbrief&p=2007/07/09/dodson (“[A]t least for the kinds of costly class action antitrust 
cases like the one initiated by Twombly, Bell Atlantic erects an additional ‘plausibility’ 
requirement of fact pleading in its place, what I have called 
 ‘notice-plus.’”). 
100 See id. at 135 (arguing that the Court “gutted the venerable language from Con-
ley v. Gibson that every civil procedure professor and student can recite almost by heart:  
that ‘a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears 
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 
would entitle him to relief’” (quoting 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957))). 
101 See Dodson, supra note 1, at 145 (arguing that “discrete changes” in pleading, 
such as Twombly, may represent an emerging trend toward transnational harmoniza-
tion in pleading standards). 
102 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 548-50. 
103 Id. at 550-52. 
104 See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 
227 (1993) (“Tacit collusion . . . describes the process, not in itself unlawful, by which 
firms in a concentrated market might in effect share monopoly power, setting their 
prices at a profit-maximizing supracompetitive level by recognizing their shared eco-
nomic interests and their interdependence with respect to price and output decisions.”). 
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agreement, but, unfortunately for them, prevailing antitrust case law 
holds that it does not.105 
The Supreme Court applied the evidentiary inference standard to 
pleadings and held that Rule 8 requires that antitrust conspiracy alle-
gations show “plausible grounds” for inferring an agreement, which 
allegations of conscious parallel conduct alone—by staying in “neu-
tral” territory106—could not.107 
Twombly raised a stir after it was decided, resulting in mass confu-
sion about its scope and meaning.108  Some wondered whether the 
Court was imposing a heightened pleading standard109 despite the 
Court’s own protestations to the contrary.110  Others debated whether 
the Court’s new “plausibility” standard applied transsubstantively or 
was restricted either to antitrust conspiracy claims (because of the 
 
105 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 553-54.  One commentator has argued that, in fact, the 
antitrust case law previously allowed conscious parallel conduct to permit an inference 
of conspiracy and that the shift in Twombly created a substantive change in antitrust 
law.  See Keith Bradley, Pleading Standards Should Not Change After Bell Atlantic v. Twom-
bly, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 117, 117 (2007) (commenting that those who be-
lieve that Twombly changed pleading standards but not substantive antitrust law “ha[ve] 
it backwards”). 
106 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 & n.5. 
107 Id. at 556-57.  The Court acknowledged Judge Charles E. Clark’s opinion in 
Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1957), which held that conscious paral-
lelism is sufficient to state a claim under section 1, but concluded that intervening Su-
preme Court cases questioning that inference in other phases of litigation suggest that 
“it is time for a fresh look at adequacy of pleading when a claim rests on parallel ac-
tion.”  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561 n.7. 
108 See Dodson, supra note 99, at 137-39 (discussing various interpretations of the 
breadth of Twombly); Posting of Scott Dodson to PrawfsBlawg, The Mystery of Twombly 
Continues, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/02/the-mystery-of.html 
(Feb. 5, 2008) [hereinafter Dodson, Prawfsblawg] (describing the confusion among 
the circuit courts).  As one judge put it, “We district court judges suddenly and unex-
pectedly find ourselves puzzled over something we thought we knew how to do with 
our eyes closed:  dispose of a motion to dismiss a case for failure to state a claim.”  Col-
leen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences:  Shockwaves in the Lower Courts After 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 851, 853 (2008).  For a bibliogra-
phy of commentary in the immediate Twombly aftermath, see Dodson, Prawfsblawg, supra. 
109 See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 68, at 475 (arguing that Twombly imposes “a plead-
ing obligation that approaches the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b)”); Posting of 
Michael Dorf to Dorf on Law, The End of Notice Pleading?, http://www.dorfonlaw.org 
/2007/05/end-of-notice-pleading.html (May 24, 2007) (asserting that Twombly imposes 
a heightened pleading standard).   But see Dodson, supra note 99, at 140 (“What Rule 8 
requires after both Erickson and Bell Atlantic are not specific facts, but sufficient facts 
such that the complaint as a whole makes a ‘showing’ of entitlement to relief.”). 
110 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569 n.14 (“[W]e do not apply any ‘heightened’ pleading 
standard, nor do we seek to broaden the scope of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9 . . . .”); 
id. at 570 (“Here, . . . we do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics . . . .”). 
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unique substantive law on permissible inferences) or perhaps just to 
certain high-cost and potentially abusive litigation.111  Still others wor-
ried that “plausibility” was imposing a merits determination at the 
pleading stage,112 again despite the Court’s protestations to the con-
trary.113  Commentators debated whether Twombly was significant as a 
pleadings case,114 particularly after the Court issued the routine Rule 8 
 
111 Compare id. at 556 (reciting “general standards” of pleading), and Dodson, supra 
note 99, at 140 ( “[T]he best reading of Bell Atlantic is that Rule 8 now requires notice-
plus pleading for all cases . . . .”), and Spencer, supra note 68, at 458-59 nn.150-52 (cit-
ing courts applying Twombly beyond the antitrust context), and Kendall W. Hannon, 
Note, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 
on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811, 1814-15 (2008) (reporting that 
courts “have applied the decision in every substantive area of law governed by Rule 8”), 
with Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (“It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible 
entitlement to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery process 
through ‘careful case management,’ given . . . that the success of judicial supervision in 
checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side.” (citation omitted)), and id. 
(“[T]he threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even 
anemic cases . . . .”), and Ides, supra note 49, at 635-36 (“[T]he ‘better’ reading of Bell 
Atlantic is that it did not change the law of pleading, but that it simply applied long-
accepted pleading standards to a unique body of law under which the plaintiffs’ com-
plaint failed to include any facts or plausible inferences supportive of a material ele-
ment of the claim specifically asserted by the plaintiffs.”). 
112 See Dodson, supra note 99, at 142 (predicting that motions to dismiss will 
“change from challenges to the legal sufficiency of a complaint to those challenging 
the factual sufficiency”); Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitu-
tional, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1851, 1882 (2008) (arguing that the “plausibility” requirement 
imposes an evidentiary standard incompatible with the Seventh Amendment).  For 
more on the doctrinal and normative implications of incorporating merits determina-
tions at the pleading stage, see Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable 
Fire:  What Two Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 
B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1221-22 (2008). 
113 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (“Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agree-
ment does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls 
for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of 
illegal agreement.”). 
114 Compare Bradley, supra note 105, at 122 (arguing that Twombly does not change 
pleading standards), and Ides, supra note 49, at 634-36 (same), and J. Douglas Ri-
chards, Three Limitations of Twombly:  Antitrust Conspiracy Inferences in a Context of Histor-
ical Monopoly, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 849, 851 (2008) (same), and Posting of Einer El-
hauge to The Volokh Conspiracy, Twombly—The New Supreme Court Antitrust 
Conspiracy Case, http://www.volokh.com/posts/1179785703.shtml (May 21, 2007) 
(calling the decision “quite insignificant”), with Spencer, supra note 68, at 431 (“Notice 
pleading is dead.”), and Posting of Scott Dodson to Civil Procedure Prof Blog, Dodson 
on Erickson, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2007/06/dodson_on_erick.html 
( June 12, 2007) (“Bell Atlantic sets a ‘notice-plus’ pleading standard.  Mere notice is no 
longer sufficient.” (italics added)), and Dorf, supra note 109 (asserting that Twombly 
imposes a heightened pleading standard).  The lower courts clearly thought Twombly 
was significant.  See Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly:  A Proposed Pleading 
Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1021-22 (report-
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case of Erickson v. Pardus.115  Meanwhile, the lower courts nearly un-
iformly took Twombly as an invitation to dismiss claims more often.116 
What seemed most clear, however, was that Twombly was beginning 
to shift the pleading focus from notice to facts—i.e., from “legal suffi-
ciency” to “factual sufficiency”—resulting in a burden on plaintiffs to 
plead a level of factual detail that the Court had not required be-
fore.117 
The Court confirmed this in no uncertain terms two years later in 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal.118  There, a detainee sued John Ashcroft, the former 
U.S. Attorney General, and Robert Mueller, the FBI Director, alleging 
 
ing that Twombly was cited over 13,000 times in U.S. courts in the twelve months after it 
was decided); Hannon, supra note 111, at 1814-15 (reporting that courts “have applied 
the decision in every substantive area of law governed by Rule 8”). 
115 See 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (citing Twombly while simultaneously 
stating that “[s]pecific facts are not necessary”).  Compare Posting of Amy Howe to 
SCOTUSblog, More on Yesterday’s Decision in No. 06-7317, Erickson v. Pardus, http:// 
www.scotusblog.com/wp/more-on-yesterdays-decision-in-no-06-7317-erickson-v-pardus 
( June 5, 2007) (“It seems likely that the Court . . . decided to summarily reverse in 
Erickson, likely in order to counteract any impression that could arise that Twombly was 
intended to set a particularly high pleading standard.”), with Dodson, supra note 99, at 
139-40 (arguing that Erickson does not mitigate the import of Twombly), and Dodson, 
supra note 114 (same), and Posting of Michael O’Shea to Concurring Opinions, How 
Cautionary is Erickson v. Pardus? (With an Excursus on Commerce Clause Disill-
usionment), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/06/how_cautionary_1 
.html (June 6, 2007) (detailing arguments on both sides of this debate). 
116 Studies seem to show that Twombly had a disproportionate impact on discrimi-
nation and civil rights claims.  See Seiner, supra note 114, at 1014 (“[T]he lower courts 
are unquestionably using the new plausibility standard to dismiss Title VII claims.”); Han-
non, supra note 111, at 1815 (concluding that dismissal rates rose in civil rights cases after 
Twombly).  For more on the implications of such disparate impact, see Elizabeth M. 
Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice:  The Disparate Impact on Civil 
Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517. 
117 See Dodson, supra note 99, at 140 (arguing that Twombly may have signaled a 
shift from notice to fact pleading); Spencer, supra note 57, at 19 (“[T]he value of no-
tice is largely irrelevant to understanding contemporary standards of substantive suffi-
ciency in pleading.”); Ward, supra note 60, at 896 (calling notice the “old narrative”).  
The Court implied as much numerous times in its opinion.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 
(“Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a probability 
requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable 
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.” (emphasis add-
ed)); id. (identifying “facts that are suggestive enough to render a § 1 conspiracy plaus-
ible” (emphasis added)); id. at 569 n.14 (“Here, our concern is not that the allegations 
in the complaint were insufficiently ‘particular[ized],’ rather, the complaint warranted 
dismissal because it failed in toto to render plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief plausible.” 
(citation omitted) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b)–(c))); id. at 570 (“Here, . . . we do not 
require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.” (emphasis added)). 
118 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
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that they adopted an unconstitutional policy that subjected him to 
harsh conditions of confinement on account of his race, religion, and 
national origin.119  The defendants raised the defense of qualified im-
munity and moved to dismiss the complaint under the auspices of 
Twombly, arguing that the allegations did not amount to a “plausible” 
showing of entitlement to relief.120 
Relying exclusively on Twombly, the Supreme Court agreed.  Citing 
Twombly’s admonition that labels, conclusions, naked assertions, and 
“formulaic recitation[s]” of the elements will not do,121 the Court con-
firmed that Twombly required “sufficient factual matter” to state a 
claim that is “plausible.”122  In addition, the Court held that “conclu-
sory” factual allegations may not be credited;123 rather, the complaint 
must contain nonconclusory, “well-pleaded factual allegations” that 
meet the “plausibility” test.124  Taking Iqbal’s well-pleaded factual alle-
gations as true, but ignoring his conclusory factual allegations, the 
Court held that he did not make a showing of “plausible” entitlement 
to relief.125 
Iqbal thus clarifies several ambiguities in Twombly.  First, the “plau-
sibility” standard is a factual-sufficiency standard that operates inde-
pendently of notice126 and is more restrictive than the previously pre-
 
119 Id. at 1942. 
120 Id.  
121 Id. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 
122 Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 
123 See id. at 1949-50 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. . . . Rule 8 marks a notable 
and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, 
but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more 
than conclusions.”). 
124 Id. at 1940-41. 
125 Id.  
126 See id. at 1948-49 (“[R]espondent must plead sufficient factual matter to show 
that petitioners adopted and implemented the detention policies at issue . . . .”); id. at 
1949 (“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s] devoid of further 
factual enhancement.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)); id. 
(“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” (quoting 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)); id. at 1950 (“Rule 8 . . . does not unlock the doors of dis-
covery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.”); id. (“[W]here the 
well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of 
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is 
entitled to relief.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2))); 
id. (“While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be 
supported by factual allegations.”); id. at 1951 (“[T]he complaint must contain facts 
plausibly showing that petitioners purposefully adopted a policy of classifying post-
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vailing factual standard.127  Second, the standard is transsubstantive, 
applying to all Rule 8 claims.128 
Thus, Iqbal and Twombly together complete a major shift in plead-
ing focus from notice to facts.  Combined with the recent congressional 
experiments in the PSLRA and Y2K Act, as well as the Solicitor Gener-
al’s brief in support of the ultimate outcome in Iqbal,129 the shift appears 
to have the support of all three branches of government.130 
 
September-11 detainees as ‘of high interest’ because of their race, religion, or national 
origin.”); id. (asserting that Iqbal “would need to allege more by way of factual con-
tent”); id. (“Yet respondent’s complaint does not contain any factual allegation suffi-
cient to plausibly suggest petitioners’ discriminatory state of mind.”); id. at 1952 (“We 
next consider the factual allegations in respondent’s complaint to determine if they 
plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.”); id. at 1954 (“But the Federal Rules do not 
require courts to credit a complaint’s conclusory statements without reference to its 
factual context.”); id. (“[R]espondent’s complaint fails to plead sufficient facts to state 
a claim . . . .”).  The Court did not even mention a notice requirement. 
127 Compare id. at 1949 (“Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent 
with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibili-
ty of entitlement to relief.’” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)), with Christopher v. 
Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 406 (2002) (“Since we are reviewing a ruling on motion to dis-
miss, we accept [the plaintiff’s] factual allegations and take them in the light most fa-
vorable to her.”), and Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (“[I]t is well estab-
lished that, in passing on a motion to dismiss, whether on the ground of lack of 
jurisdiction over the subject matter or for failure to state a cause of action, the allega-
tions of the complaint should be construed favorably to the pleader.”), and WRIGHT & 
MILLER, supra note 30, § 1357 (“For purposes of the motion to dismiss, the complaint 
is construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff and its allegations are taken as 
true. . . . Basically, the court will accept the pleader's description of what happened to 
him along with any conclusions that can reasonably be drawn therefrom.”).  Compare 
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954  (“Rule 8 does not empower respondent to plead the bare ele-
ments of his cause of action, affix the label ‘general allegation,’ and expect his com-
plaint to survive a motion to dismiss.”), with Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 
(1957) (“The respondents also argue that the complaint failed to set forth specific 
facts to support its general allegations of discrimination and that its dismissal is there-
fore proper.  The decisive answer to this is that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do 
not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim.”).  
Conspicuously, the Iqbal Court made no mention of Erickson. 
128 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (“Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading 
standard for all civil actions, and it applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike.” 
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 1953-54 (“We decline 
respondent’s invitation to relax the pleading requirements on the ground that the 
Court of Appeals promises petitioners minimally intrusive discovery.”). 
129 See Brief for the Petitioners at 51-52, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (No. 07-1015) (ar-
guing that respondent failed to make factual allegations and asking for dismissal of the 
complaint). 
130 That is not to say that support is uniform.  Senator Arlen Specter recently in-
troduced a bill in the Senate to restore the notice pleading standard of Conley v. Gibson.  
See Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. § 2. 
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There are still significant differences between even Iqbal and, say, 
the German pleading system.  “Plausibility,” for example, is somewhat 
unique and arguably has a different focus than the pleading regimes 
in other countries.  Not even the U.S. Supreme Court has gone so far 
as to require the submission of evidence at the pleading stage.  In 
these respects, then, the U.S. pleading trend is not moving in a 
straight line directly toward foreign pleading regimes.  The details are 
still very different. 
But my point is more general.  Before Twombly and the PSLRA, 
federal pleading under Rule 8 was based uniformly on notice.  Now, it 
is based on facts.  That is a momentous shift in kind—one that takes 
the U.S. system to a fact-based system fundamentally more akin to for-
eign pleading regimes.  After Iqbal, U.S. federal pleading looks a lot 
more foreign. 
IV.  POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF AMERICAN FEDERAL PLEADING TRENDS 
So what might this trend in American pleading from notice to 
facts mean for comparative civil procedure?  It is entirely possible that 
the answer is “not much.”  This is, admittedly, only one small change 
in a very small part of American civil procedure.  It remains to be seen 
whether the trend accelerates, widens, remains static, or, perhaps, 
even retreats.  And it remains to be seen whether the trend branches 
into comparative or international analyses.  In short, it would not be 
an understatement to say that the recent pleading trends may mean 
very little for comparative civil procedure. 
Nevertheless, enough uncertainty exists to merit exploration of 
what further meaningful effects the trend might have.  So let me ha-
zard a series of thoughts—not entirely distinct from each other—that 
reflect both the promises and the perils of comparative civil proce-
dure in light of the pleading trend observed above. 
First, a comparative approach might enrich the debate over the 
American pleading system.  The trend toward fact pleading has gen-
erated both outcries and defenses.131  Few defenders, however, have 
 
131 Compare, e.g., Sale, supra note 96, at 562-65, 578-79 (criticizing the PSLRA’s 
heightened pleading requirement for making it more difficult to bring difficult-to-
prove but potentially meritorious claims), and Spencer, supra note 68, at 433 (arguing 
that Twombly is an unwarranted and ill-advised departure from notice pleading), with 
Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly:  How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) 
Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 68-72 (2007) (noting that the preven-
tion of discovery abuse is another rationale for plausibility pleading), and Keith N. Hyl-
ton, When Should a Case Be Dismissed?  The Economics of Pleading and Summary Judgment 
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relied on the fact that most other countries have some form of fact 
pleading, and that such prevalence suggests that fact pleading may be 
an appropriate way to solve certain pleading problems.  True, the ar-
gument is not so facile—foreign systems based on fact pleading look 
very different from the American system in other facets of civil proce-
dure, namely discovery132 and the presence of a jury—but the incorpo-
ration of comparative civil procedure seems particularly relevant to 
the current debate in America regarding pleading standards.  Indeed, 
critics of the Conley v. Gibson notice-pleading regime have used com-
parative analyses to attack the American system of liberal pleading in 
the past.133  The time seems particularly ripe for Conley critics to now 
defend the current trends with the same comparative views.  At the 
same time, opponents of the trend may find comparative arguments 
effective in rebuttal by, for example, contrasting the nonconclusory, 
plausibility-pleading regime adopted by Bell Atlantic and Iqbal with the 
strict fact-pleading model of foreign systems.  My point is not that 
comparative civil procedure ought to support one position or the oth-
er, but rather that it seems like an appropriate way to enliven the debate. 
Second, the resulting enrichment of that debate through foreign 
comparisons may lead to a reexamination and better understanding 
of America’s own procedural policy balances (or even litigation cul-
ture).  Pleading balances the underlying policies of access to courts 
and justice with efficiency and economy.  Virtually all pleading re-
gimes balance these policies, yet most foreign regimes have adopted a 
pleading mechanism that achieves a balance different from that of the 
United States.  Given the size and complexity of modern commercial 
litigation, the wide variation in levels of discovery across cases,134 and 
the paucity of trial adjudication,135 perhaps it is time to reevaluate the 
 
Standards, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 39, 41-42 (2008) (providing an economic justifica-
tion for supporting plausibility pleading in certain cases). 
132 See Linda S. Mullenix, Lessons from Abroad:  Complexity and Convergence, 46 VILL. 
L. REV. 1, 6 (2001) (“[N]o other country in the world has any system of discovery ap-
proaching that provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). 
133 See, e.g., Hazard, supra note 3, at 1671-72 (comparing the American notice 
pleading to other common law systems and highlighting the advantages of fact plead-
ing); Maxeiner, supra note 72, at 601 (criticizing American legal indeterminacy and 
favoring the certainty offered by a fact-based European system of law). 
134 Compare Epstein, supra note 131, at 69-71 (noting substantial discovery burdens 
in certain commercial litigation cases), with James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Manage-
ment:  Further Analysis of the Civil Justice Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613, 
621 (1998) (reporting minimal or no discovery in a significant portion (about fifty 
percent in 1975) of civil cases in six federal district courts). 
135 See Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The Revolution of 1938 and Its Dis-
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American balance by taking into consideration the fact-pleading solu-
tion adopted by most other jurisdictions. 
Third, foreign solutions might provide illustrations of potential 
models for U.S. reform.  Say a reevaluation occurs, taking foreign 
models into account, and leads to a recognition that the American 
policy balance has shifted from an emphasis on court access to an 
emphasis on efficiency.136  One might conclude, at least in certain cas-
es, that the current pleading regime needs reform.137  Moving toward 
the fact pleading exemplified by foreign systems, then, might be an 
appropriate way to accommodate an underlying shift toward efficien-
cy.138  Alternatively, changes to other procedural mechanisms aside 
from pleading, such as fee-shifting, discovery, or more attentive judi-
cial case management,139 also might accommodate the policy shift and 
 
contents, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 275, 279 (2008) (reporting that only 1.3% of federal civil 
cases reached trial in 2006).  Other studies have similarly shown that trial dispositions 
make up less than 2% of all federal adjudications.  See Marc Galanter, A World Without 
Trials?, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 7, 7-8 (finding that trials comprised 1.7% of federal cases 
in 2004); see also Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial:  An Examination of Trials and Re-
lated Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004) (docu-
menting the rapid disappearance of the trial in American civil cases). 
136 See, e.g., Hylton, supra note 131, at 41 (“[E]arly dismissals, by eliminating low-
merit claims before they become costly, offer benefits to society in comparison to late 
dismissals.”); Perschbacher & Bassett, supra note 135, at 286-87 (observing a shifting 
emphasis toward efficiency in litigation and away from full and fair adjudication on the 
merits); Spencer, supra note 68, at 433 (observing a transition from a liberal and open-
access ethos to a “restrictive” and “efficiency-oriented” ethos); The Supreme Court, 2006 
Term—Leading Cases, 121 HARV. L. REV. 185, 312 (2007) (“[T]he Court seemed moti-
vated by a desire to increase efficiency by allowing judges to dismiss the cases in which 
discovery seems least likely to be fruitful.”). 
137 See Epstein, supra note 131, at 67-69 (arguing that Rule 8 provides too lax a 
pleading standard for antitrust litigation); Sale, supra note 96, at 552-57 (reporting that 
the PSLRA’s heightened pleading requirement was designed to curb frivolous securi-
ties claims); see also Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpen-
ters, 459 U.S. 519, 528 n.17 (1983) (“[I]n a case of this magnitude, a district court 
must retain the power to insist upon some specificity in pleading before allowing a po-
tentially massive factual controversy to proceed.”). 
138 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 131, at 68-69 (arguing that fact pleading is more 
appropriate for modern, complex litigation); Hylton, supra note 131, at 41 (“In gener-
al, pleading standards should vary with the . . . social costs of litigation.”). 
139 See, e.g., Marcus, Revival, supra note 35, at 493-94 (arguing that judicial case 
management offers better tools for weeding out frivolous claims than heightened 
pleading standards); Randal C. Picker, Twombly, Leegin, and the Reshaping of Antitrust, 
2007 SUP. CT. REV. 161, 177 (preferring discovery reform to pleading reform); Sale, 
supra note 96, at 579-83 (arguing that limiting discovery would have been more effec-
tive than the PSLRA’s heightened pleading standard at curbing frivolous claims); 
Spencer, supra note 57, at 30-31 (suggesting that changes to the American Rule, such 
as ordering each side to bear her own attorney’s fees regardless of outcome, might bet-
ter curb frivolous claims). 
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could be informed by foreign models.140  The point is that comparative 
analyses may inform any conversation about procedural reform. 
Fourth, and related to the third point, comparative perspectives 
can illuminate the resurging debate over the transsubstantivity of the 
Federal Rules.  Whether the Federal Rules (and the pleading rules in 
particular) should vary by claim is a debate with a long pedigree,141 but 
Twombly’s arguable focus on the uniqueness of antitrust conspiracy 
claims and the threat of coercive litigation costs has reenergized it,142 
and Iqbal’s purported reaffirmation of the transsubstantivity of the 
“plausibility” standard was not substantially justified (and undoubtedly 
will create problems).143  Foreign procedural systems may have insights 
 
140 See Langbein, supra note 71, at 825 (praising the German system of active judi-
cial case management); Mullenix, supra note 132, at 4-12 (listing the differences be-
tween the American procedural system and other civil law systems); id. at 12-31 (noting 
the ways in which American and foreign systems have begun to converge in complex 
civil litigation). 
141 Compare, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, 
Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 713-14 (1988) (criticizing 
transsubstantivity), and Subrin, supra note 29, at 985 (same), with EDWARD BRUNET & 
MARTIN H. REDISH, SUMMARY JUDGMENT:  FEDERAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 9:1 (3d ed. 
2006) (presenting arguments for and the historical background of the transsubstantive 
nature of the Federal Rules), and Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Mani-
festly Unfounded Assertions:  An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2081-84 (1988) (noting, in favor of transsubstantive 
rules, that “procedural complexity defeats substantive rights”), and Robert M. Cover, 
For James Wm. Moore:  Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 732-39 
(1975) (arguing for transsubstantivity), and Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and 
Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 
2244-47 (1989) (responding to criticism of the Federal Rules’ transsubstantivity), and 
Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater:  The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 
BROOK. L. REV. 761, 776-79 (1993) (reviewing the merits and drawbacks of transsubs-
tantivity), and Subrin, supra note 29, at 977 (reporting that Charles Clark, the principal 
draftsman of Rule 8, supported its transsubstantive application for the purposes of “un-
iformity and simplicity”). 
142 Compare, e.g., Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 803-04 
(7th Cir. 2008) (stating that pleading standards vary depending upon the likely discov-
ery burdens), and Spencer, supra note 57, at 30 n.129 (citing cases suggesting that 
plausibility-pleading standards depend upon the type of claim alleged), with Stephen 
B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 WIS. L. REV. 535, 537  
(“The argument (made by some lower courts and scholars) that the standards emerg-
ing from Twombly should, and can, be confined to antitrust conspiracy cases confronts 
the foundational assumptions that the Federal Rules are transsubstantive and cannot 
be amended by judicial interpretation.”), and Ward, supra note 60, at 912 (arguing that 
varying pleading standards are problematic). 
143 See Posting of Scott Dodson to Civil Procedure Prof Blog, Beyond Twombly, 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2009/05/beyond-twombly-by-prof-scott-
dodson.html (May 18, 2009) (“[A]pplying a restrictive pleading standard transsubstan-
tively will surely result in fewer meritorious cases filed, more meritorious cases dis-
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useful to the transsubstantivity debate.  Take, as just one example, the 
possibility of crafting different standards for public interest cases.144  
The American system of invasive and liberal discovery may be particu-
larly suited to public interest litigation (even if between private parties 
in, say, a consumer products class action).145  In those cases, truth may 
be more important than efficiency.146  But in cases involving only pri-
vate interests, access to low-cost litigation and justice based on “formal 
truth” may be stronger values.  In those cases, a foreign procedural 
model may be superior.147  On the other hand, when public interests 
are already addressed by the political branches, as they are in many 
foreign countries,148 perhaps narrowing court access for private litiga-
tion of public interests makes some sense.149  This resurgence of the 
 
missed, and less unlawful conduct redressed . . . .”). 
144 A retreat from transsubstantivity no doubt would have its own workability prob-
lems, not the least of which would be the difficulty of designing a category-specific sys-
tem without creating confusion over when a case falls into one or the other category. 
145 See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM 15-16 (2001) (noting that private 
litigation is actually a strong feature of public-interest litigation, providing an alterna-
tive or supplement to the administrative state); Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails:  Re-
gulating Risky Products Through Tort Litigation, 95 GEO. L.J. 693, 731-32 (2007) (arguing 
that private litigation is a useful adjunct to public regulation). 
146 Professor Hein Kötz has put it this way: 
[A] strong case can be made for the view that to the extent to which private 
litigation serves the vindication of a public interest, the parties must be 
equipped with robust discovery procedures to ferret out the truth, even at the 
expense of business or personal privacy.  Nor would it seem plausible to put 
the discovery tools in the hands of judges or parajudicial officials, if only be-
cause discovery conducted by a judge or magistrate would not be as thorough 
as discovery conducted by the parties’ lawyers. 
Kötz, supra note 19, at 75. 
147 Kötz notes that this is the reasoning behind the German system, stating that 
[t]he typical case at which the German system is aimed involves a comparative-
ly small amount of money, raises no major issue of public policy, and is merely 
a dispute between private parties about private rights.  In such cases it obvious-
ly makes sense to give the judge a leading role in the examination of witnesses 
and wider powers over the evidentiary process, thereby reducing considerably 
the amount of lawyer effort and cost in exchange for a modest increase in ef-
fort and activity on the part of the judge. 
Id. at 77. 
148 In Europe, public interests generally are addressed by the political branches, 
not in court, and class actions for such cases are generally unheard of.  See id. at 75 
(stating that European observers find bundling thousands of claims together for one 
trial to be “astonishing”). 
149 See, e.g., Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2396 (2007) 
(holding that private antitrust claims could not be asserted at least in part because the 
SEC already extensively regulates the activity).  But see Sale, supra note 96, at 564 (pre-
suming that the SEC, with limited resources, often pursues only the clear cases of fraud 
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transsubstantivity debate provides a new opportunity to use compara-
tive analyses for illumination. 
Fifth, foreign systems can provide a predictive model of what con-
sequences might follow a change to the American procedural system.  
Professor Julie Suk, for example, has demonstrated that as civil proce-
dure limits private enforcement of rights, public enforcement (or 
criminal enforcement) may become prevalent, with some narrowing 
consequences for the substantive rights at stake.150  To illustrate, she 
argues that the limitations on civil discovery in France have pushed 
employment discrimination claims out of the civil system and into the 
criminal system, where discrimination claims are enforced primarily 
through criminal prosecutions.151  Her argument is illuminating:  for-
eign procedural regimes have much to tell us about the procedural, 
substantive, and structural consequences of different procedural 
choices.  To the extent that recent trends reflect a deeper policy shift, 
we would be wise to consider what foreign models have to tell us 
about the consequences any concomitant rules changes might have.152 
Sixth, procedural convergence may produce opportunities for 
harmonization with foreign systems, particularly for transnational liti-
gation.  One obstacle to harmonization has been a perception that it 
would require significant changes to American procedure.153  But the 
pleadings convergence described above suggests that that obstacle 
ought to be less important as the regimes move closer together.  In 
addition, one of the principal costs of harmonization—learning a for-
eign system154—seems like only a modest problem for pleadings har-
 
that would survive the heightened pleading standard of the PSLRA anyway). 
150 See generally Julie C. Suk, Procedural Path Dependence:  Discrimination and the Civil-
Criminal Divide, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1315 (2008). 
151 See id. at 1331-40 (reporting that procedural advantages for anti-employment-
discrimination plaintiffs have led to the majority of racial discrimination actions being 
brought in criminal proceedings). 
152 For an excellent example of what this kind of comparative analysis might look 
like in the pleading context, see Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Detailed Fact Pleading:  The 
Lessons of Scottish Civil Procedure, 36 INT’L LAW. 1185, 1199-1201 (2002) (explaining that 
recent trends suggest that Scotland is starting to loosen its pleading requirements be-
cause the currently stringent standards go too far in preventing plaintiffs from bring-
ing potentially meritorious claims).   
153 See CHASE ET AL., supra note 1, at 568 (questioning “whether and how the de-
scribed differences between American procedure and that prevalent elsewhere can be 
compromised sufficiently to achieve genuine harmonization”); Dubinsky, supra note 
22, at 352 (“Transnationalists specializing in procedural law tend to see America’s 
modern encounter with globalization and its byproduct, transnational litigation, as re-
quiring significant change in American procedural law . . . .”). 
154 See Geoffrey P. Miller, The Legal-Economic Analysis of Comparative Civil Procedure, 
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monization because fact pleading is not entirely foreign to American 
procedure.  It was, after all, a hallmark of the Codes, and many states 
still require fact pleading.155  Thus, the pleadings trends discussed 
above may make palatable the pleading standard proposed by 
ALI/UNIDROIT:  “In the pleading phase, the parties must present in 
reasonable detail the relevant facts, their contentions of law, and the 
relief requested, and describe with sufficient specification the availa-
ble evidence to be offered in support of their allegations.”156  The por-
tion pertaining to evidence is not unlike the Rule 26(a) mandatory 
disclosures that already apply in federal practice.157  In short, it seems 
that the recent trend towards fact pleading in the United States is a 
small enough step away from traditional American pleading and a big 
enough step toward pleading practice in other countries that mea-
ningful harmonization between them may occur.158 
Seventh, the pleading trends may provide an opportunity for 
America to reduce its isolationism and improve international rela-
tions.  America puts a disproportionate premium on American proce-
dure.159  Suggestions for improvement based on foreign models often 
are ignored or criticized.160  Perhaps in part because of America’s go-it-
alone attitude, many civil law scholars in turn see the common law sys-
tem (and the American system in particular) as crude and disorga-
nized.161  Foreign jurists and scholars ridicule American discovery 
rules.162  They resist American-style reforms.163  Pleadings convergence, 
 
45 AM. J. COMP. L. 905, 917-18 (1997) (arguing that retraining lawyers would be a large 
economic cost of harmonization). 
155 See Dodson, supra note 1, at 134 (explaining that California adheres to code 
pleading and Louisiana to civil law pleading).  
156 ALI/UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE princ. 11.3 
(2006). 
157 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) (requiring that parties disclose, “without awaiting a discov-
ery request,” the names of parties with discoverable information, copies of certain 
documents, computations of damages, and insurance information). 
158 Cf. Clermont, supra note 19, at xii (“All this is not to say that transplants are im-
possible. . . . But any such transplant must be limited in scope and sensitive  
to context.”). 
159 See supra note 23. 
160 See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen et al., The German Advantage in Civil Procedure:  A Plea for 
More Details and Fewer Generalities in Comparative Scholarship, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 705, 761-
62 (1988) (criticizing Langbein’s defense of the German procedural system); Reitz, 
supra note 20, at 988 (arguing that cultural differences would make it difficult to adopt 
the German system). 
161 MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 2, at 3. 
162 See Franklin A. Gevurtz et al., Report Regarding the Pacific McGeorge Workshop on 
Globalizing the Law School Curriculum, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 267, 
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particularly if justified by comparative sources, may go a long way to-
ward making a good-faith showing of willingness to join the interna-
tional conversation on civil procedure.164 
Eighth, if America were to diminish its isolation by moving toward 
pleading convergence, America might be able to export U.S. proce-
dural law and norms abroad.  In the past, American civil procedure 
exportation has met with mixed results165 and much skepticism.166  But 
a good first step toward turning that around is to have a respected 
voice in the conversation, and, as my seventh point asserts, the plead-
ing trend may achieve just that.  Doing so could give the United States 
the opportunity to influence, in a distinctly American way, a host of 
reforms in other countries that are converging toward U.S. procedure.  
Asian and Russian systems are experimenting with juries,167 a feature 
generally unique to U.S. procedure.168  Other countries are experi-
menting with aggregate litigation, another quintessentially American 
phenomenon.169  The trends provide the opportunity for America to 
 
284 (2006) (noting “the foreign resentment directed toward U.S. discovery practices”); 
The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 136, at 312 (“Discovery is wide-
ly believed to be a major problem with the American civil justice system.”). 
163 For a particularly apt example in the context of class-action development, see 
Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?, 62 
VAND. L. REV. 179, 179-80 (2009). 
164 A corollary might be the creation of—and increased American involvement in 
the development of—an international judicial system, as advocated by Professor Jenny 
Martinez.  See generally Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 
STAN. L. REV. 429 (2003). 
165 On the success side, Quebec, a faithful civil law country, supplemented its Code 
with Americanized discovery principles.  See Schlosser, supra note 71, at 17 (stating that 
Quebec made the change despite “its deep-rooted aversion to anything which is Eng-
lish or American”).  On the failure side, Japan’s overlay of Americanized procedure 
onto its civil law code after World War II never took hold.  See Marcus, supra note 27, at 
162 (explaining that Japan returned eventually to its prewar procedural system, which 
was borrowed from Germany’s procedural system). 
166 See Gerhard Walter & Samuel P. Baumgartner, Utility and Feasibility of Transna-
tional Rules of Civil Procedure:  Some German and Swiss Reactions to the Hazard-Taruffo 
Project, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 463, 467-68 (1998) (reporting that German and Swiss proce-
duralists are highly skeptical of the feasibility of European countries adopting some of the 
more American contributions to the Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure).  
167 See Robert M. Bloom, Jury Trials in Japan, 28 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 35, 
37-38 (2006) (reporting that mixed-jury trials will begin for certain serious criminal 
offenses in 2009); Associated Press, South Korea:  First Trial by Jury, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 
2008, at A6.  In addition, civil law litigation in general is becoming more concentrated 
and trial-like.  See MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 2, at 113-15 (stating that 
the trend is toward more concentrated events but comparing the traditional civil law 
process to the concentrated version). 
168 MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 2, at 113. 
169 See Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil—A Model for Civil Law Countries, 51 AM. J. 
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make a positive impact on the development of global procedural 
norms instead of perennially being contrasted with them. 
Ninth, a comparative conversation might turn inward, thereby 
bringing in the varied practices of the states.  Federal perspectives are 
so dominant that the state practices, with their wealth of diversity, are 
often overlooked.  Not all judicial systems in the United States adhere 
to the liberal notice-pleading standard adopted by Conley.170  Embrac-
ing a comparativist view may broaden the study of our own state pro-
cedural system, revealing that American litigants actually are quite 
comfortable with different pleading standards and different proce-
dural mechanisms.  Recognition of state variation may, in turn, make 
international comparison or harmonization more palatable because 
the variation would not seem so foreign.171 
CONCLUSION 
Whatever one thinks normatively about Twombly, Iqbal, and recent 
congressional attempts to implement fact-pleading requirements, I be-
lieve these trends present an opportunity for comparative civil proce-
dure.  These pleading trends demonstrate a convergence toward for-
eign fact-pleading models that may ultimately provide the basis for 
valuable comparative study and analysis. 
The likelihood and value of that comparative inquiry can only be 
strengthened by recognizing convergence in other areas of civil pro-
cedure.  With recent trends toward judicial case management, restrict-
ing discovery, fee shifting, and oversight of jury awards,172 American 
procedural exceptionalism may be retreating in a number of areas.  If 
so, then my modest claim about pleading trends may have much 
broader and more fruitful implications. 
 
COMP. L. 311, 312-13, 313 n.1 (2003) (listing countries).  See generally Richard A. Nagare-
da, Aggregate Litigation Across the Atlantic and the Future of American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. 
L. REV. 1, 20-26 (2009) (observing foreign convergence toward U.S. class-action models). 
170 See Z.W. Julius Chen, Note, Following the Leader:  Twombly, Pleading Standards, 
and Procedural Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1439-40 (2008) (noting that twen-
ty-six states and the District of Columbia followed Conley’s interpretation of pleading 
rules at the time Twombly was decided). 
171 Of course, looking internally to resolve transnational issues may also be limit-
ing.  See Dubinsky, supra note 22, at 308 (making this point). 
172 See Dodson, supra note 1, at 147-49 (discussing trends in case management and 
jury awards); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Authorized Managerialism Under the Federal Rules—And 
the Extent of Convergence with Civil-Law Judging, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 191, 193 (2007) (find-
ing some convergence in judicial case management); Ward, supra note 60, at 913 (dis-
cussing recent controls and limitations on discovery). 
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Of course, the promise of comparative civil procedure is not with-
out its pitfalls.  The inquiry must have the breadth and depth to avoid 
the risk of being misleading173 or even detrimental,174 yet it must be 
modest and gradual enough to be feasible.175  It remains to be seen 
whether the pleading trends (and any other convergences) can walk 
that line successfully enough to reap the comparative benefits. 
 
 
173 See Gidi, supra note 21, at 505 (“[A]n isolated comparison of legal rules would 
lead to an incomplete understanding and misleading picture of the legal systems.”); 
Marcus, supra note 3, at 711 (cautioning against the comparison of procedural features 
in isolation). 
174 See Mirjan Damaška, The Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary Transplants:  Anglo-American 
and Continental Experiments, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 839, 839 (1997) (warning of the unin-
tended consequences of inserting foreign rules into domestic ones without consider-
ing the institutional context that led to the rules’ initial development); Marcus, supra 
note 3, at 710 (warning that isolated changes might cause system imbalances). 
175 See Dodson, supra note 1, at 143 (“Even small-scale but rapid changes risk caus-
ing intrasystem inconsistency if not made with sensitivity to the web of interconnected-
ness that procedure draws upon.”). 
